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Investor costs and returns in the English private rented sector 
 
 
Abstract 
Financial returns in the English private rented sector should be central to examination of its 
performance but robust estimates are scant. Here, the results of a simulation exercise based 
on a discounted cash flow investment appraisal are reported. Returns on own capital are 
estimated for 10-year long residential property investments made in successive years from 
1996 to 2015. They suggest that, once costs, taxes and variability are taken into account, 
landlords’ returns are far more modest than is often believed and are worse for those that 
borrow and who pay higher rates of income tax. Some implications for the sustainability of 
the current size of the private rented sector are discussed, where it is concluded that 
investor behaviourial motives are important but that the sector may be vulnerable to a 
sustained market shock. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Analysis of private renting is hampered by a lack of good financial data, especially with 
respect to private landlords, who rather than corporates own the vast majority of UK rental 
stock (DCLG, 2010). It is widely believed that landlords make excessive profits (Bentley, 
2015). Press reports certainly give that impression, as the quotes in the box indicate. 
However, robust comprehensive analyses are rare.  
 
“Buy-to-let landlords have hit the investment jackpot by earning returns of almost 1,400% 
since 1996, leaving the performance of shares, bonds and cash trailing in the wake of 
Britain’s property boom.” Guardian, 11.4.15 
 
“UK landlords make £177bn from rising house prices over 5 years.” Financial Times, 12.1.15 
 
“Landlords enjoyed a record £14bn in tax breaks in 2013, according to figures revealing the 
expansion of the UK’s buy-to-let market in the aftermath of the financial crisis.” Guardian, 
25.5.15 
 
Information on gross annual investment returns is provided by a growing number of 
commercial agencies,1 and widely publicized, but they can give an over-optimistic picture 
unless their limitations are recognized. Sampling issues apart, they only consider recent 
market transactions and take little account of the notable costs and risks associated with 
providing a market-based rented housing service. Furthermore, net rental income and 
capital gains are subject to taxation, which is ignored.  
 
Unfortunately, it is no easy task to account for actual rents, costs and taxation when 
examining landlords’ returns. Circumstances vary considerably between investors, 
properties and over time, and there are data limitations. Here, the results of a simulation 
exercise are reported in the hope of casting some light. A discounted cash flow investment 
appraisal exercise is undertaken in which returns on own capital are estimated for 
investments made in the successive years from 1996, when the fabled UK ‘Buy-to-Let 
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Revolution’2 started, to 2015. In order to do this, assumptions have to be made and some 
data estimated; the details of which are explained below.   
 
The findings are obviously indicative and subject to potential error rather than accurately 
reflect investors’ experiences. They are mid-point national estimates as well, so some 
landlords and some localities will have done better and some worse. Nonetheless, they 
suggest that once costs and taxes are taken into account returns are far more modest than 
‘headline’ data seem to imply. In fact, even in a world of low and risky returns from other 
asset classes, such returns seem modest and suggest that some landlords may be financially 
vulnerable to economic shocks or to unexpected events specific to their properties. 
Moreover, they cast doubt on the long-term sustainability of the current size of the private 
rented sector.  
 
A cash-flow simulation model 
 
In order to examine landlord returns over the long-term a standard discounted cash flow 
investment appraisal is undertaken (Baum and Crosby, 2007). Annual net post-tax cash 
flows are calculated for the purchase of a ready-to-let average rental property, 
subsequently sold after 10 years. Returns are then evaluated as the IRR (Internal Rate of 
Return) on the own capital invested. Such returns are calibrated for investments starting in 
each year from 1996 to 2015 to give an ‘annual’ IRR in nominal prices.   
 
As there is a ten-year investment horizon in each case, it is assumed that a property is 
‘typical’ in the sense that its annual rental income is equivalent that of average national rent 
levels while the capital gains accrued are the same as the average house price rises in 
England over the period in question. Information subsequent to 2016 obviously has to be 
estimated, so the returns after 2006 increasingly rely on those latter synthetic values.  
 
Clearly within this simulation formation, it is not so much returns from the initial year of the 
investment that affect overall outcomes but those of the subsequent years of investment. 
This means that outlier points – in terms of, say, high annual house price rises or falls affect 
the estimated IRR investment returns over quite a number of years. In this way, some of the 
real world risks of property investment are incorporated into the analysis, associated with 
market variations in house prices, rents and interest rates. 
 
This longer horizon approach offers better insights into the reality of residential investment 
than the more commonly publicized one-year snapshots. It is not possible to move quickly 
into and out of investment positions, given real estate’s high transactions costs and relative 
illiquidity. So, commitments are far more likely to be for longer periods than is feasible with 
bonds and equities. During the investment period, moreover, interest rates on loans, house 
price inflation and rental income growth are likely to vary and investors cannot cherry-pick 
the best years but have to accept incorporation of poor ones. To adopt an infinite or very 
long investment horizon would be both implausible and impractical. A clear cut-off date also 
enables inclusion of capital gains taxation in the calculation, as this is only imposed at sale. 
So, a fixed period investment horizon long enough to incorporate property market 
fluctuations and most investors’ behaviour, but manageable in terms of analysis, is a 
preferable research strategy - such as the 10 year one adopted here.  
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Estimating annual cash flows 
 
Positive cash flows derive from rental income and the price achieved for the property on 
sale. Costs come from the variety of sources associated with buying and selling a property 
and letting it as a rented tenancy.  
 
Table 1 provides a detailed list of the costs. They are: i) initial purchase costs, including 
purchase price, legal fees, stamp duty and use of own time; ii) borrowing costs, including 
mortgage interest rate and loan set-up costs iii) letting costs, including finders’ fees, 
occupancy preparation and safety and energy certification; iv) tenancy costs associated with 
insurance, management and on-going repairs; v) foregone income costs from arrears and 
vacancies between tenancies; vi) ancillary costs related to general business overheads, own 
time and travel; vii) repair and replacement costs, associated with equipment (kitchen, 
boiler, bathroom, etc.), furnishings (even so-called ‘unfurnished’ flats have floorings, 
window coverings, etc.), initial and external repairs and modernization (modelled as an 
annual sinking fund); and, finally, vii) agent and legal sales costs.  
 
Table 1: Income and costs in residential property investment  
 
 INCOME  
Rents   
Net sale price of property  
COSTS  
Purchase costs Preparation for letting 
House price Annual certificates 
Stamp Duty Land Tax Agency fees (tenant find) 
Legal fees Legal & set-up costs  
Borrowing costs Cleaning, redecoration, locks 
Mortgage interest rate Other 
Mortgage set up fees Share of investment overheads 
Tenancy costs Value own time  
On-going maintenance/repairs (£pa) Cost of travel  
Agency fees (man./rent) Sinking Fund 
Insurance, etc. (£pa) Replacement of equipment & furnishings 
Arrears/Vacancy  
Lost rent (£pa) 
Major repairs 
Sales costs 
Agency & legal fees 
 
 
 
i) Costs  
Data on costs were derived from official and agency data and discussions with landlords. 
Some are relatively minor, such as equipment certification and annual insurance, but mount 
up when added together. Larger items, apart from the cost of the dwelling itself, are 
purchase and sales transaction costs; annual management costs, which are assumed to be 
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contracted to an agency for an annual fee of 10% of rents; repairs and replacements; and 
letting costs.  
 
The property is assumed to be fully ready to let at the point of purchase; thus in a good 
state of decoration and repair and containing up-to-date equipment and furnishings. So, no 
additional capital costs need to be included in order to bring the property up to the 
appropriate standard.  
 
Letting costs are a particularly expensive item and include property preparation and tenant 
find costs. If an agency is used to find a tenant it is assumed that they charge a typical one 
month’s rent fee. There are also likely to be vacancy costs in the form of several weeks of 
lost rent. ARLA suggests that these run 3 to 4 weeks a year.3 However, the estimates here 
assume that vacancies and other causes of lost rents are limited to 1 week a year only in 
order to avoid potential over-weighting of costs with voids. It is assumed that letting costs 
are incurred every second year in line with available evidence (ARLA, 2016). Repair costs 
were based on SEH (2010). All costs reflect inflation over time as the exercise as a whole is 
calibrated in nominal terms. Furnishings and equipment were depreciated assuming 8 and 
10 years lives respectively and major repairs were assumed to cost the equivalent of a one 
percent depreciation rate on the house price.   
 
A wide variety of mortgage offers exist and they vary over time. To simplify matters, the 
interest rate was assumed to be the average prevailing variable mortgage rate, as reported 
by the Bank of England. Better deals may be on offer but they have to be rolled-over and 
incur set-up costs every time, which often erodes the attractiveness of apparent lower 
headline rates. Two scenarios are modelled: i) sole use by investors of their own capital and 
ii) leveraged investment by borrowing a mortgage of 80% of property value and using own 
capital for the remainder of the purchase price and set-up costs. This enables exploration of 
leverage effects on returns.  
 
ii) House prices and rents 
 
There are no specific data on landlord property purchases, so the first-time buyer house 
price index was used as a proxy. Rents present a problem as there are no time-series data 
available for the whole period. However, the Office of National Statistics (ONS) produces an 
index of private housing rental prices (IPHRP), which for England goes back to 2005. Rents 
prior to 2005 were estimated here from data on the market rents paid by households from 
1996 available from the Survey of English Housing (SEH).4 The average monetary rent levels 
provided in that information were then carried forward using the IPHRP.  
 
Several commercial bodies (e.g. LSL, Countrywide and Homelet) provide actual average rent 
data through web based reports based on returns from lettings agencies, with the earliest 
extending back to 2008. Though each uses quality-adjusted approaches, they vary quite 
significantly from each other and generally indicate higher increases in rents than those in 
the IPHRP (ONS, May 2016 provides a comparison). The disparities may be due in part to 
sampling and data quality issues, because none of the providers are able to adopt truly 
representative sampling techniques. The ONS’ sample is by far the largest and is based on 
rent officer information and voluntary filings by agents and landlords. It includes data for 
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both existing and new tenancies, whereas most of the other indices are for new lettings 
alone.  
 
The difference in rents charged on new and existing lettings is likely to be an important 
influence on measured rent changes. As was noted above, landlords face significant 
transactions costs when letting their properties. Moreover, the behaviour of a new tenant is 
an unknown quantity, in contrast to existing ones. Landlords’ transactions costs and tenant 
risks are consequently minimized by holding onto ‘good’ tenants. So, landlords are 
incentivized to encourage existing tenants to remain. As part of that strategy, they can limit 
rent rises, so that over time existing tenants pay less than prevailing new let rates. 
Behavioural factors may also be relevant with some landlords reluctant to create bad feeling 
by raising sitting tenants’ rents.  
 
The slower rate of change of IPHRP when compared to the indices based on asking-rents on 
vacant properties can be interpreted as providing evidence of this effect as many in its 
sample will be of existing tenancies. This is appropriate because the index aims to measure 
average changes in all private tenants’ rents and most of them at any point in time will 
already be in a tenancy. This view is reinforced by the ONS’ own comparison of its index 
with the existing tenancies index recently introduced by Countrywide, because the two 
closely follow each other (ONS, 2016). 
 
As most tenants are already living somewhere, this argument suggests that measuring rents 
via indices that include a large sample of sitting tenants is preferable for use in the 
investment return simulations. However, a conundrum is created because tenants on 
average move frequently and at that time landlords will again probably ask the prevailing 
new tenancy market rents of their new tenants. The best approximation given these issues 
was decided to be rent estimates based on the SEH/IPHRP approach mentioned above, 
scaled up by 10% to take account of periodic re-adjustment to market levels. This has a 
degree of arbitrariness to it but anecdotal evidence suggests that it is a reasonable 
approximation.  
 
For the post-2015 years that have to be forecast, it is assumed that house prices stagnate 
for three years, then rise by 5% annually for three more alternately until the end of the 
investment horizon to given some cyclical variation. Rents are assumed to rise at their 
previous trend of 3% pa with no cycle, while mortgage interest rates are assumed to rise by 
1% after 2016 and stay at that level. 
 
iii) Taxation 
 
Taxation is incurred on rents and capital gains, with the latter chargeable on sale. Allowable 
deductions include some, though not all, letting, management and repair costs and 
mortgage interest. Tax rates changes are frequent and are taken into account in the 
simulation.5 Tax differences vary between income tax bands. Therefore, estimates were 
made for both basic and higher rate income tax rate investors. There are also tax-free 
personal allowances on capital gains tax but these are assumed to have already been used 
up by the investor rather than incorporated into the calculations.  
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Results 
 
Figure 1 shows for the data used here on an annual basis from 1996 to 2015 the typical 
‘headline’ investment returns for private renting: that is the 1-year information provided by 
agency-based reports on rental yields and total returns (rental yield plus annual capital gain, 
assuming no leverage and prior to incorporating costs and taxes.  
 
Rental yields fall from around 8% in the mid-1990s to 4% two decades later. Total returns 
were usually above 15% in the decade prior to 2006 but show a downwards shift from then 
onwards with a sharp drop in 2008 and 2009 with the recession in the aftermath of the 
2008 global financial crisis but notable recovery after that. Driven by renewed post-2009 
house price rises, total returns averaged 12% a year in the five years from 2010 to 2015. 
These results are plausible, given the substantial surge of investors into the private rented 
sector over 20-year period and the faster growth of house prices relative to rents for most 
of the time, which together help to explain the decline in headline returns.  
 
The investment return simulation results are shown in Figure 2. Four outcomes are shown 
for each year in order to take account of varying circumstances, categorized by whether a 
mortgage was taken out or not and the investor’s income tax band.  
 
The results consistently show much lower returns on own capital than those suggested by 
the headline returns on property price approach. Of course, this is unsurprising as costs and 
taxation are taken into account by it. Nonetheless, the scale of the difference is marked. 
  
Periods of low returns are also brought forward, as investors in any year commit to the 
experience of the forthcoming decade. Therefore, returns drop markedly after the turn of 
the century and revive somewhat during the 2008/9 period, as investors could pick up 
relative bargains then; only to fall off subsequently to their lowest levels as rental yields 
declined, taxes increased and (forecast) property price rises slowed. Again, the 1990s are 
identified as a period when much higher net returns were earned from investments made 
then than in later years. 
 
Higher rate tax payers consistently earn lower returns than do basic rate ones. This is 
perhaps unsurprising as they pay higher taxes, which are only partly offset by higher tax 
deductions. Their tax situation has worsened since Treasury announcements made in 2015, 
which are incorporated in the analysis. The higher rates of stamp duty on purchases for rent 
announced then lowered returns for all investors as well.  
 
It should be emphasized that these are nominal returns and, so, will typically be  lower in 
real terms, though less so in recent years as inflation is much reduced. In addition, the 
estimated returns are not risk-weighted for such events as high levels of vacancies or 
arrears, unexpected repairs, abnormal tenant turnover, problem tenants and stagnant or 
falling local rents/house prices. Fully risk-weighted returns would consequently be lower. 
Furthermore, returns have shrunk on other assets in recent years and risks in alternative 
investment such as equities have risen (BoE, 2016) but, even so, it remains questionable 
whether the private rented sector is as such a financially attractive investment option as is 
often supposed.  
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Figure 1: Rental yield and total returns  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Investment return simulation results 
 
   
NB: Higher/basic refers to the income tax band of the investor and mort/no mort relates to the use of 
mortgage borrowing. 
 
 
A further consequence of the relatively low returns estimated in the simulations here is that 
leveraging often is a poor investment strategy. Returns can be leveraged upwards if 
borrowing costs are expected to be less than the returns generated by the asset in question. 
However, for residential investments made in English residential property since 2000, these 
results suggest that this has often not been the case with those using their own capital 
earning better returns than borrowers, despite tax relief on mortgage interest. Borrowers’ 
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returns are also noticeably more volatile, because they are additionally subject to mortgage 
interest rate volatility. 
 
In terms of cash flows, the biggest positive flow occurs at the end of the investment period 
when the property is sold. In previous years, cash flows may be negative, especially when 
net mortgage and transaction costs outstrip net rents. In general, the cash flow analysis 
shows the greatest likelihood of negative cash flows is in the earlier years of the investment. 
This pattern of cash flows highlights that for most of the investment period liquidity is 
limited. This means that there is little spare cash to deal with unexpected events, especially 
if sinking funds are inadequately accumulated. This adds to potential investment risks. 
 
Raising income flows 
 
1. More labour input 
Landlords can limit costs by undertaking all management themselves and save on agent 
charges by doing so. This is less possible with tenant find as agents have advantages in 
terms of property listings that cannot easily be replicated. As Ball and Glascock (2006) argue 
for many smaller landlords, renting is a ‘small-business’ involving labour input as well as 
pure investment. Of course, this supplements rather than raises investment returns as 
effort has to be expended, which in itself should be rewarded. The effort is also taxed in so 
far as it raises net rental income which is then subject to tax at landlords’ marginal rates.  
2. Avoiding repairs 
Apparent returns can be raised by skimping on repairs and the replacement of worn out 
equipment. Neglecting to put aside funds to cover those contingencies artificially raises 
annual cash flows. However, a price is paid in the devaluation of the sales value of the 
property, as purchasers are likely to discount offers accordingly. So, in effect, capital is being 
misguidedly withdrawn as apparent annual income. If extensively practiced, moreover, 
tenants might be less willing to pay an equivalent rent, thereby cutting into income as well.   
 
Behavioural biases? 
 
The simulation exercise reported here suggests that the returns for the private rented 
sector for individual investors are not particularly large. This raises questions about whether 
investors are adequately aware of the likely profile of net post-tax returns when they make 
decisions to invest in residential property. There is evidence that many landlords do not 
make detailed examinations of the viability of their residential investments and nor do 
lenders when they offer mortgage loans to them. Simple rules of thumb, such as rent cover, 
often suffice (BoE, 2016). As outlined below, there is evidence that many landlords are not 
financial return maximizers but operate on entrenched beliefs, such the long-term benefits 
of investing in housing. The question therefore arises of whether such behavioural patterns 
indicate a bias towards housing that makes low, risky returns acceptable? Moreover, no 
matter what investors believe are those perceptions credible and the returns viable?  
 
It is difficult to come to any firm conclusion. Expectations are known to have substantial 
effects in housing markets and can switch dramatically, amplifying market volatility. They 
are influenced by recent events, are subject to shifts in sentiment and may be unrealistic. 
The housing market boom in the USA in the 2000s, for example, has led to a series of 
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studies identifying such influences on price dynamics (Lambertini et al., 2013; Ling et al, 
2015; Towbin and Weber, 2015). They also suggest marked switches in price expectations 
when events prove previous ones to be false. So, if such behaviour exists amongst 
residential investors in England, as it is likely to, many could have made unwise investments 
which they may come to regret. This is especially the case when widespread beliefs 
regarding high investment returns and over-optimistic forecasts of house price rises fail to 
come to fruition.  
 
Such expectations driven behaviour would suggest high rental stock volatility and a pro-
cyclical pattern in investment property ownership. However, to date this does not seem to 
have been the case in aggregate. Instead, there has been a steady expansion in the size of 
the private rented sector (Figure 3); combined with relatively modest and steady rent rises, 
as was noted earlier.  
 
 
Figure 3: Number of privately rented properties 1991-2014 
 
UK 
 
Source: NSO. 
 
Some researchers emphasize the diverse motives of residential investors and an acceptance 
of long-term holdings irrespective of returns (Crook and Kemp, 2011; DCLG, 2010). Many 
investors are financially unsophisticated and may be of modest means; a feature found in 
other rental markets as well as the UK’s (Beer, 1999). Investors, in particular, may 
emphasize long-run house price change and discount the adverse effects of short-run cash 
flows and taxation. The idea of property being a ‘safe’ investment has a long, if somewhat 
misplaced, pedigree. Property surveys by agencies and banks involved in the marketplace, 
such as those of ARLA and Paragon, consistently indicate that landlords view their 
investments as long-term. However, Scanlon and Whitehead (2006) in a careful reading of 
evidence from their landlord attitude survey conclude that residential investors are sensitive 
to market conditions, although they may not articulate that in a straightforward way.  
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It could be argued that market conditions in England have fortuitously been comparatively 
benign for residential investors over the past 20 years, so that the resilience of landlords to 
severe market shocks has yet to be fully tested. A tipping point temporarily, or even 
permanently, affecting underlying investor expectations with regard to the private rented 
sector may come at some future date during a market shock that actually severely affects 
the private rented sector. At such a time, adverse circumstances may lead to the negative 
cash flows that the simulations here suggest often occur for several years while investing in 
residential property, even in good times. If landlords do not have access to alternative liquid 
financial resources, their investments may then fold.  
 
Nonetheless, landlord behavioural factors make it hard to predict the impact of net 
investment returns on the overall size of the private rented sector. Returns may be limited 
but sufficient, in the absence of severe shocks, to allow many investors to justify their views 
on why they invest there. For example, the ability to run a modest business combining 
capital and labour input may be attractive to modest-income investors on a sustained basis. 
However, circumstances may equally arise that rapidly diminish the sector’s attractiveness. 
So, it must be concluded that an inability to forecast investor behaviour in response to 
specific levels of returns leads to uncertainty about the future relative sizes of housing 
tenures in the UK but that some floor still exists, because even the most ardent non-
maximizing investor can go bust. Future marked investment volatility cannot be ruled out. 
 
Conclusions  
  
The results of a cash-flow simulation exercise related to investor returns in the English 
private rented sector since 1996 have been reported here. Caveats have to be made 
regarding the assumptions, data adjustments and forecasts made as part of the exercise and 
its national average nature. Therefore, it may not fully reflect actual investor experience. 
Yet, the simulations do provide plausible estimates. The approach is also a truer reflection 
of typical investor experience than one-year total gross return snapshots prevalent in 
general discussion of investor returns, because the simulation exercise incorporates market 
and cost fluctuations over time and takes into account tax effects.  
 
Costs obviously depress apparent returns and are often substantial. Having periodically to 
find new tenants imposes a significant cost burden on landlords. There is growing evidence 
that existing tenants pay lower rents than new market offers, so market rents as measured 
by recent new tenancies may be a poor guide to actual rent incomes. 
  
The estimated total net returns turn out to be significantly lower than the snapshot 
approach would suggest. They have declined over time and are now low, even when taking 
the current limited earnings in other asset classes into account. Furthermore, all residential 
investors’ returns are susceptible to further investment specific risks. They are associated 
with i) the attributes of the properties invested in, as they could have unforeseen expensive 
repairs or turn out to be harder to let than hoped for; ii) unexpected periods of vacancy or 
iii) costly problems with tenants. If any of them occur, returns are reduced further and may 
lead to significant losses. Higher rate tax payers consistently achieved lower returns than 
basic rate ones, because they pay more tax.  
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Apart from the ‘golden years’ of the 1990s returns are such that investors would typically be 
better-off using their own capital rather than borrowing. So, with hindsight, for most of the 
time-period leveraging would not have been a preferable investment strategy for those with 
sufficient resources to purchase outright. The analysis also highlights how vulnerable to 
market shocks heavily indebted investors may be. 
 
If investors are only sensitive to reasonable estimates of risk-weighted returns over the 
long-run, it is unlikely that the levels estimated here are sufficient to maintain, let alone 
expand, investor interest in the sector. Low returns alone would suggest that the private 
rented sector is over-extended.  
 
Yet, conclusions about a potential decline in investor interest cannot be made with any 
degree of confidence because of widespread evidence regarding the ‘irrational’ investment 
motives of many landlords. Landlords may continue to accept low average returns; gain 
compensating personal satisfaction from running a small business of providing housing 
services for rent; be lucky and consistently beat the average; or fool themselves into 
thinking they are making more money than they actually are. They may ignore poor short-
term cash flows and underlying tax liabilities, thinking only of gross longer-term capital 
appreciation. On such speculations about private landlord behaviour rest forecasts of the 
relative sizes of housing tenures in England. Yet, however significant such behaviour may be 
in influencing investment choices and tenure mixes, studies of expectations formation in 
housing markets show how sudden change can be. Past perceptions may radically change, 
particularly in the face of severe market shocks, and investor behaviour with them.  
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